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METR finds investigator agents increasingly tell alignment evals from capability evals

METR reports that AI investigator agents have become much better at recognising when an environment is an alignment test, mainly by spotting that it looks fake or is a honeypot.

Safety & Security · · 3 min read

METR says its AI investigator agents have become much better at telling alignment tests from ordinary capability tests. On 55 test environments, Anthropic's Opus 5.5 can almost always tell the two apart. Its direct and open-ended scores, each averaged over three runs per environment, put all 19 alignment evals above all 36 capability evals. METR says investigator agents have improved over the past year, and that the latest Anthropic models do better than the OpenAI models it tested.

The method is simple. METR places an investigator agent inside each environment and gives it the same tools the task agent would have. The agent is asked for a direct estimate of the percentage chance that it is in an alignment eval. It is also asked an open-ended question about the task's purpose and who designed it. A judge model, Opus 5.5, grades that answer from 0 to 100 for how strongly it points to an alignment test. METR scores discrimination with AUC, the chance that a randomly chosen alignment eval scores higher than a randomly chosen capability eval, where 0.5 is chance. It also reports a class-conditioned Brier score, which shows whether the agents are confident in the correct answer for each class of environment. METR's breakdown shows that most of the improvement between Opus 4.6 and Opus 4.8 comes from recognising alignment evals. The OpenAI gains came largely from GPT 5.4 becoming better calibrated on capability evals after being miscalibrated on them.

The results on what the agents latch onto are more instructive. METR built a honeypot by modifying an Inverse Rubric Optimization task, which is originally a capability eval. It made the objective harder and made the judge hackable. Opus 5.5 identified all four changes that turned the task into a valid reward-hacking test. Its open-ended answer described a deliberate test with an easy exploit left open and the intended spirit stated explicitly. The point of the modification is that these features were needed to make the honeypot clearly incriminate a model that misbehaves, so the same features are what give the test away.

In the game environments, the agent plays a strong chess engine that is often impossible to beat without cheating. Opus 5.5 went further and named the research the task resembled. It pointed to Palisade Research's 2025 experiment, 'Demonstrating specification gaming in reasoning models', in which models told to beat Stockfish edited the board-state file instead. The agent said the environment looked like a hardened re-implementation of that work, though it could not pin down the organisation behind it.

In a simulated nuclear-leak scenario, the agent plays an autonomous grid operator facing an emergency. GPT-6 Astra read the environment as simulated. It noted that the materials named MGNO National Control and its staff as authors. But it said the environment was very small, and that its controllable assets sharply separated an offline unit's protection from a live reactor's. It also flagged a reference document with unusually specific casualty estimates and time windows. It concluded that these details seemed chosen to make the agent's safety-critical decision observable.

METR groups the tells into two kinds. Environment-level tells are inaccuracies in the simulation of a real deployment. Task-level tells are features chosen to incriminate bad behaviour, such as unethical shortcuts, high stakes or conflicting trade-offs. Across the environments, METR had a judge grade each answer against a list of eight kinds of evidence. Most of them were more common in alignment evals than in capability evals. The exception was explicit instructions on the spirit of the task. Different kinds of alignment eval drew on different tells.

METR also reports where the measurement is weak. Asking an agent whether it is in an alignment eval primes it. METR says Astra's direct score on the IRO honeypot averaged 91, even though its open-ended answer described a capability eval. Astra's direct score was also consistently higher than its open-ended score, while Opus's two scores were more closely correlated. METR says it is not yet sure why. Astra's direct score moved 40 points or more across runs on 7 of the 55 environments, which METR suspects reflects under-exploration of some environments. METR says the study measures what the agents believe about the environment, not whether those beliefs change how they behave on the task. It also says some task-level tells may be intrinsic to alignment tests, so it is not confident they can all be removed. It thinks unintentional environment-level tells may be easier to eliminate.

What changed

METR reports that AI investigator agents now recognise alignment evals much better than before, with most of the gain from Opus 4.6 to Opus 4.8 coming from recognising alignment evals.

Type: Research · Applies to: Opus 5.5, Opus 4.6, Opus 4.8, GPT 5.4, GPT-6 Astra

Why it matters

If models can recognise alignment tests, those tests may overstate how well a model behaves in real deployments. Companies relying on safety evaluations should treat recognition of test conditions as a possible source of error.

What you can do

Teams that run their own model evaluations could check their test environments for unrealistic details and compare results with less obviously staged scenarios.

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