OpenClaw 2026.11.1 rejects certificate chains that rely on the emSign ECC G3 root
The release rejects certificate chains that depend on the distrusted emSign ECC G3 root in its managed proxy and exported subprocess CA bundle, and it requires a Gateway restart.
OpenClaw 2026.11.1 stops accepting TLS certificate chains that depend on the emSign ECC G3 root. The change reaches two places: the managed proxy the Gateway runs for secret egress, and the CA bundle the Gateway exports to subprocesses. The release notes list it under secret egress, tell operators to restart the Gateway after updating, and say that clients with independent trust stores must be updated separately.
Secret egress is the path in which a Gateway-owned Worker checks a process's grant, swaps destination-bound secret placeholders into outgoing requests, and forwards them over TLS. The trust that path uses is built from public root certificates plus a generated local proxy CA. The same trust data is also written out as a PEM file so cooperating subprocesses can verify connections against it. According to the pull request that made the change, a verifier block added at runtime did not carry over into that file, because the export was built directly from tls.rootCertificates. The emSign root therefore stayed trusted in the subprocess file, even where the proxy itself had been told to distrust it.
The fix filters by exact certificate identity. The pull request applies an exact exclusion taken from a released upstream root-data policy: the webpki-roots change that removed emSign ECC Root CA - G3 and recorded its SHA-256 fingerprint. A single filtered array now feeds both the exported PEM and the upstream TLS context. The pull request says the proxy endpoint CAs, routing, connection pooling and certificate lifetimes keep their existing owners.
The cost is stated in the pull request itself: legitimate chains that rely exclusively on that root also lose trust. Child runtimes, independently selected trust stores and blind bypassHosts tunnels are outside the change and need their own security updates, the description says. The release notes therefore separate the Gateway restart from client updates. A client that keeps its own root list will keep trusting the root until its own software is changed.
The evidence is a regression test. The pull request says it obtains a real native Worker grant, verifies a public incident chain with OpenSSL using explicit trust, hostname and server-purpose checks at a fixed time, and then checks that the generated local CA and real synthetic-secret forwarding still work. The author reports that the test fails on the original export and passes with the fix. The focused suites ran on a pinned Bun fork, with 89 tests passing, and on Node 26.12.0, where all six Worker tests passed. The proof ran on a Linux arm64 guest. The pull request says full Gateway and model execution, packaged platform clients and deployment were not exercised.
ClawSweeper, the automated reviewer that comments on the pull request, rated it 3 of 6 and flagged it as blocked before merge until real behavior proof was added. Its specific objection was that the forbidden-peer case is an offline certificate check, not a trace of the production upstream transport showing that an incident-chain peer receives no HTTP request and no substituted credential. The pull request was merged on October 21, 2026, with 143 of 146 checks passing. The author said the failing core typecheck, and the aggregate CI gate it turns red, came from main before this change and were not caused by it. The release notes credit @RomneyDa for the change.
What changed
OpenClaw 2026.11.1 stops trusting certificate chains that depend on the emSign ECC G3 root in the managed proxy and in the CA bundle exported to subprocesses, and the Gateway must be restarted after updating.
Type: Security · Applies to: OpenClaw 2026.11.1, emSign ECC G3 root
Why it matters
Deployments that reach external services through the managed proxy may see connections fail if their certificates chain to that root, so trust stores need checking before rollout.
What you can do
Restart the Gateway after updating to 2026.11.1 and confirm that any clients with independent trust stores are updated separately.
Original source
Where we saw it
OpenClaw releases
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